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Summary 
Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less 
competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to 
differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these 
questions were positive, as suggested in recent work (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), 
Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (1999), and Aragones and Palfrey (2003)), 
this would mean that extremist candidates are bad politicians. We consider a two 
candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional 
policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show 
that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public 
goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and 
comparative advantage in providing the two public goods). 
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 Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program?
When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme
positions in order to diﬀerentiate himself from the more competent candi-
date? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent
work, this would mean that extremist candidates are bad politicians.
Our objective is to answer these questions, and in so doing, to reexamine
the results obtained in the recent literature on the competence of politicians.
We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption,
with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates hetero-
geneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates
relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two
types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in
providing the two public goods).
The closest works to this paper are Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (1999), and Aragones and Palfrey
(2003). These papers focus on variations of the spatial model of election,
introduced by Downs (1957), where two candidates have to choose a posi-
tion on the unit interval. In all these works, candidates have an unidimen-
sional personal characteristic that determines their (dis)advantage. In these
analyzes, voters utility is separable in policy and politician personal charac-
teristic. They study the existence of the equilibrium and conclude that the
advantaged candidate locates more centrally than the disadvantaged one.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) show that, in the absence of uncertainty,
the advantaged candidate locates at the center, and that the disadvantaged
candidate always loses and locates anywhere on the unit interval. As noticed
by Aragones and Palfrey (2002), the existence of equilibrium becomes a prob-
lem when there is uncertainty or when candidates maximize their share of
votes. In this last case, the advantaged candidate always wants to choose the
same program as the disadvantaged candidate to get all the votes, whereas
the disadvantaged candidate has an incentive to diﬀerentiate his platform
in order to get at least some votes. Aragones and Palfrey (2002) examine
3the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in this electoral competition. They
consider a discrete unit interval, and show that, when the advantage is small
enough, the advantaged candidate chooses a probability distribution with a
single peak in the center, whereas the disadvantaged candidate chooses a
probability distribution with two peaks, one on each side of the center. In
the present work, as in these two papers, voters utility function can be writ-
ten as additively separable in policy and valence, but candidates scores on
the valence dimension diﬀers among voters. In the public goods consump-
tion model, if a candidate beneﬁts from an absolute advantage, our results
are close to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000); when an equilibrium exists,
a candidate with an absolute advantage generally locates centrally, and the
disadvantaged candidate locates anywhere in his policy set.
Goseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2003) show that the existence
problem can disappear when candidates have policy preferences. Groseclose
(1999) shows that when candidates put suﬃciently high weight on policy, a
pure strategy equilibrium may exist and the advantaged candidate chooses
a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate. Aragones and
Palfrey (2003) consider two candidates who privately know their ideal point
and their tradeoﬀs between policy preferences and winning and show that a
pure strategy equilibrium always exists. They also show that the result of
Aragones and Palfrey (2002) is the limit case when policy preferences goes
to zero.
One stream of the political economy literature, reviewed by Persson and
Tabellini (2000, chapter 4, section 4.7), assumes that candidates diﬀer in
their ability to deliver services to citizens 1. These papers investigate electoral
accountability when voters have incomplete information on politicians. Since
we focus on candidates locations with incomplete information about voter
types, we consider that there is no uncertainty on candidates competences.
1Rogoﬀ and Siebert (1988) study a model of adverse selection; Rogoﬀ (1990) and Banks
and Sundaram (1993, 1996) study politicians accountability in models with moral hazard
and adverse selection.
4Other scholars consider diﬀerent asymmetries between the candidates2.
Several analyzes show that Republican and Democrat have diﬀerent eﬀects
on the economy3, and study the impact of real or perceived economic per-
formance on elections outcomes4.
However, none of these papers considers candidates with a two dimen-
sional competence. In section 3.1, we propose a political competition model
where the candidates propose two public goods. The two opportunistic can-
didates have diﬀerent competences to provide two public goods. They share
the same beliefs on the uncertain median voter preferences and maximize
their probability of winning. In section 3.2, we deﬁne two kinds of advan-
tages in this model, the absolute advantage (one candidate is better in the
provision of both goods) and the comparative advantage (each candidate is
better in the provision of one of the two goods). We show that this model is
equivalent to a non-spatial valence model, with two orthogonal dimensions,
a policy dimension and a non-policy dimension. In this valence model, we
deﬁne the Unanimity Valence advantage (one candidate as a higher ”score”
for all voters on the non-policy dimension). We show that the absolute ad-
vantage and the Unanimity Valence advantage are two similar deﬁnitions. In
section 3, we focus on the case where one candidate has an absolute advan-
tage; our results are similar to those of spatial valence models, that is, an
equilibrium exists if and only if the advantage is large enough, the advantaged
2See Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Groseclose (2001) for a review of this liter-
ature.
3Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982), and Chappel and Keech (1986) show that Democrat and
Republican governments have diﬀerent inﬂuences on the unemployment rate. Alesina
and Sachs (1988) and Tabellini and La Via (1989) show that parties are associated with
diﬀerent monetary policies.
4Fiorina (1981) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) assume that citizens vote retro-
spectively conditioned to the diﬀerence between platforms and performance. Aragones
(1997) surveys and contributes to the literature on the ”negativity eﬀect” where voters
vote on past performances and weight more negative than positive informations. See also
Kernell (1977) , Lau (1982), Klein (1991), Abelson and Levi (1985), Mueller (1973), Bloom
and Price (1975), and Key (1966).
5candidate wins with certainty, and he generally locates more centrally than
the disadvantaged candidate. In section 3.4, we analyze the situation of com-
parative advantages; the results are sensibly diﬀerent: in the public goods
consumption model, platforms do not converge, whereas they converge to the
non-ideological voter preferred program in the valence model. We show that
a pure strategy equilibrium generally exists. Finally, candidate’s equilibrium
probability of winning increases with the candidate competences. Further-
more, we show that a mixed Nash equilibrium exists whatever the kind of
advantage considered.
1 The model
The model is inspired by the ”Multidimensional Public Consumption Model”
introduced in Tabellini and Alesina (1990). We ﬁrst deﬁne the two types of
agents, voters and candidates:
Voters: Let assume a population of voters of mass 1. Citizens have the
same income wi = w and face a tax rate τ.L e tc be a representative citizen’s
private consumption level. All citizens face the same budget constraint:
c =( 1− τ)w. The government provides two public goods, x ≥ 0a n dy ≥ 0.
Citizens disagree on the importance of the two public goods and citizen i’s
preferences are parametrized by the weight αi ∈ [0,1] he places on public
good x.I f1<α i < 0, his preferences are summarized in the following utility
function:
Wi () = u(c)+αi ln(x)+( 1− αi)ln(y)i fx,y > 0, (1)
= −∞ if xy =0 ,
If αi =0 ,
Wi () = u(c)+l n( y)i fy>0, (2)
== −∞ if y =0
6And, if αi =1 ,
Wi () = u(c)+l n( x)i fx>0, (3)
== −∞ if x =0 ,
Since citizens have the same private consumption level, u(c)d o e sn o tp l a y
any role in the analysis and will be dropped from the model. These pref-
erences belong to the set of intermediate preferences deﬁned by Grandmont
(1978), and satisfy the single crossing property. Hence, a Condorcet winner
exists and it is given by the preferred policy of the median voter αm.
Candidates: We consider two oﬃce motivated candidates A and B.
When a candidate is elected, he gets an exogenous ego-rent R. Candidates
share the same beliefs over the distribution of voters, and suppose that αi
is distributed on [0,1] with the cumulative distribution function F.I n t h e
seminal model of multidimensional public consumption, the two candidates
have the same competencies to provide both public goods. And, if there is
no debt (as in our model), both candidates platforms converge to the median
voter preferred policy.
We relax this assumption and suppose that each candidate has diﬀerent
competencies associated to each public good. Candidates are heterogeneous






respectively be candidate A competencies






denotes candidate B competen-
cies to provide x and y. These competencies will determine the candidates’
eﬃciency in providing each public good, and are inversely related to the cost
of providing each public good. With these assumptions, candidates face dif-
ferent budget constraints when they are in power. We consider linear costs
to provide both public goods and normalize the government budget, τw, to

























y > 0a n dx,y ≥ 0.
Since we suppose that platforms must be credible and there is no debt,






respectively denote one candidate A platform and one candidate B platform.
Remark that if we put all the competencies to 1, then the model is exactly
identical to the multidimensional public consumption model. The policy set
becomes unidimensional and there exists a unique equilibrium where both
platforms converge to the expected median voter preferred program. Now
we show that results are aﬀected when competencies diﬀer among goods and
candidates.
2 Link with valence models
2.1 Link with valence models
Recall that when A proposes zA =
 
xA,yA 




ηA =1 , (6)
Symmetrically, when B proposes zB =
 
xB,yB 




ηB =1 , (7)
To compare the public consumption model to valence models, we propose two
variable changes. Let sA = xA
ηA
x and sB = xB
ηB
x denote the share invested in good
x by candidate A and candidate B respectively. After this transformation,
the strategies sA and sB belong to [0,1]. With the budget constraints, we


































We will refer to this non-spatial model as the ”valence model”. Indeed,
voters utility functions are then separable in the policy and valence dimen-
sions. We now turn to deﬁne two diﬀerent kinds of advantages in the initial
model with public goods, and translate them into advantages in the valence
model.
2.2 Deﬁnitions
We deﬁne absolute and comparative advantages in the context of public goods
consumption. A candidate has an absolute advantage when he outperforms
his opponent over the two policy dimensions. A natural deﬁnition of an
absolute advantage is the following:
Deﬁnition 1 A candidate A has an absolute advantage on another candidate




y ,w i t ha t
least one strict inequality.
We deﬁne the comparative advantages situation where each candidate
is relatively better than his opponent in providing one of the public goods.
Formally,
Deﬁnition 2 A candidate A has a comparative advantage to provide x and









We will now consider the equivalent of the absolute advantage in a valence
model. Say that a candidate has a Unanimity Valence Advantage (UVA)
when all voters consider him best on the valence dimension:
6Notice that δC
i may be negative. The important argument is the diﬀerence between
both candidates images δA
i − δB
i . If the latter is positive, then i prefers A to B on the
non-policy dimension.
9Deﬁnition 3 Candidate A has a Unanimity Valence Advantage (UVA) if
and only if: ∀i,δA
i ≥ δB
i with, for at least one voter j, δA
j >δ B
j .
The following proposition conﬁrms the intuition that the UVA and the
absolute advantage are, in our context, two similar deﬁnitions:
Proposition 1 Candidate A has a UVA if and only if he has an absolute
advantage.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The necessary condition is straightforward: if Candidate A has an abso-




y , with at least one strict inequality,
and it directly follows that:



















































Regarding the suﬃcient condition, suppose that Candidate A has a UVA,
then:

























Notice that for αi = 0, the inequality becomes ηA
y ≥ ηB




Now, we claim that ηA
y = ηB
y = ηy and ηA
x = ηB
x = ηx. By deﬁnition of
the UVA, there exists α in [0,1] such that:
αln(ηx)+( 1− α)ln(ηy) >αln(ηx)+( 1− α)ln(ηy),
this is impossible.
102.3 Payoﬀ functions
In this section, we derive the candidates payoﬀ functions. Candidates max-
imize their probability of victory. Let πA and πB denote candidate A and
candidate B’s expected payoﬀ. Furthermore as πB =1 −πA, it is suﬃcient to
compute candidate A’s payoﬀ function. Considering the probability of win-
ning in the election is equivalent to considering that candidates maximize
























Let   α be the type of the voter indiﬀerent between zA and zB :
  αln(xA)+( 1−   α)ln(yA)=  αln(xB)+( 1−   α)ln(yB), (11)
We deduce from this expression:













Hence, candidate A gets votes from left (small αi) or votes from right (high


























if yA = yB,
=0 i f yB >y A.











= F (  α)R (15)
This payoﬀ function seems to have many discontinuities, but, in the proofs
of propositions 5 and 9, we show that discontinuities only arise for situations
where at least one of the candidates only proposes one of the two goods. We
now turn to the determination of equilibrium when one of the candidates has
an absolute advantage.
3 Absolute advantage of one of the candi-
dates
Not surprisingly, since the situation of an absolute advantage is similar to the
unidimensional spatial model, our results are comparable to those of spatial
models with uncertainty over the median voter preferences. When the ad-
vantage is small, as in spatial models8, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose that A has an absolute advantage (equivalently, a








y > 1, then there does not exist a pure
strategy equilibrium.
In the case where relative competencies are equal to 1, the condition of
proposition 2 is ln2 >δ A−δB. The intuition of this result is the same as in the
spatial model. The advantaged candidate gets all votes when he imitates the
disadvantaged candidate. Since the advantage is small, the disadvantaged
candidate can diﬀerentiate himself from the advantaged candidate and get
a positive share of votes. There is thus no pure strategy equilibrium. Now,
when the advantage is large enough, the advantaged candidate can locate to
8see Groseclose (1999), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Aragones and Palfrey
(2002) for similar results in spatial models.
12a central position so that the disadvantaged candidate gets no vote, whatever
his policy choice9:
Proposition 3 Suppose that A has an absolute advantage (equivalently, a








y ≤ 1, then there exists a continuum of
pure strategy equilibria where payoﬀs are πA∗ =1and πB∗ =0 , and platforms
are given by:






























, and zB∗ is any candidate B feasible program,
and,
















, and sB∗ is any real in [0,1].
In this situation, the advantaged candidate is always certain to win the
election, because he always provides more of both goods than the disadvan-
taged candidate. We now analyze the relation between absolute advantage
and the location of the electoral platform.
3.1 Absolute advantage and location on the policy space
In our context, we need to specify what we call a central position in the
valence model and a symmetric platform in the public goods consumption
model. We suppose from now on that F is the cumulative of the uniform
distribution on [0,1].
Deﬁnition 4 In the public goods consumption model, a platform z =( x,y) ∈
[0,1]
2 is symmetric if and only if x = y.
9See Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) for a similar result in a spatial model with no
uncertainty about the voters distribution.
13Deﬁnition 5 In the valence model, a platform s ∈ [0,1] is central if and
only if s = 1
2.
Now, we deﬁne the following order relation to compare candidates posi-
tions:
Deﬁnition 6 In the public goods consumption model, a platform z =( x,y)






















We call I (z) the position index of policy z. The more a platform is
asymmetric, the higher the position index. We use this index to compare
the candidates equilibrium positions. In the valence model, we consider the
following criteria:
Deﬁnition 7 In the valence model, a platform s is (weakly) more moder-
ate than a platform s  if and only if
 









In the case where candidate A has an absolute advantage, these deﬁni-
tions do not allow to make a clear comparison, because of the multiplicity of
equilibria. We thus consider the average candidates equilibrium positions of
the candidates. Let SC∗ be the set of candidate C equilibrium platforms.
Deﬁnition 8 In the public goods consumption model, if the equilibrium pay-
oﬀs are identical for every equilibrium, candidate C’ platform is said to be








Deﬁnition 9 In the valence model, if the equilibrium payoﬀs are identical
for every equilibrium, candidate C’ platform is said to be (weakly) generally










   s − 1
2
   ds.
14When a candidate has an absolute advantage, he always wins with prob-
ability 1, and his opponent always loses. Our deﬁnitions suppose that each
candidate plays one of the equilibrium strategies with equal probability. If
candidate A has an absolute advantage, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 Candidate A’ platform is generally more moderate and gen-
erally more symmetric than candidate B.
This result is similar to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000). The advantaged
candidate locates more centrally than the disadvantaged candidate. Now,
we complete the analysis to give insight on the predictability of the election
outcome.
3.2 Mixed strategy equilibrium: existence
We have shown that, when the absolute advantage is large enough, a pure
strategy equilibrium exists, then it ensures the existence of a mixed strategy









then there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium. We know however that
a mixed strategy equilibrium exists:
Proposition 5 If a candidate has an absolute advantage, then there exists
a mixed strategy equilibrium.
The proof a this proposition is similar to Aragones and Palfrey (2002,
Theorem 5), and uses the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) theorem on the exis-
tence of a mixed strategy equilibrium for games with discontinuous payoﬀs.
Since we focus on the diﬀerent types of advantage, we do not character-
ize the mixed strategy equilibrium. We focus now on the situation where
candidates have comparative advantages.
154 Comparative advantage
In this section, we derive the unique equilibrium when candidates have com-
parative advantages, and provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for ex-
istence.
4.1 Equilibrium
We suppose that the distribution of the median voter type is uniform, F (α)=
α,t h a tA has a comparative advantage to provide x and B has a compar-








y be the respective
strength of candidate A and candidate B comparative advantage (in this
case, deﬁnition 2 states that θx,θ y > 1) . The following result holds:
Proposition 6 Suppose that candidate A has a comparative advantage in
good x and candidate B a comparative advantage in good y.T h e n ,t h e r e
exists at most one pure strategy equilibrium, where the equilibrium payoﬀs
are:
π
A∗ =1−   α
∗, and π
B∗ =   α
∗.
with   α∗ =
lnθy
ln(θxθy), and the equilibrium platforms are:






x   α
∗,η
A









x   α
∗,η
B




And, in the valence model:
s
A∗ = s
B∗ =   α
∗.
The intuition for the proof is as follows. Candidates cannot both choose
platforms specializing in one of the public goods. If it were true, one of them
would have an absolute advantage, and by the same reasoning as in the previ-
ous Section, a pure strategy equilibrium may fail to exist. Candidates cannot
16specialize in the public good for which they don’t have a comparative ad-
vantage, since they would then have an incentive to use their advantage and
provide more of both good than their opponent. Hence, candidates must be
specializing in the public good for which they have a comparative advantage.
In the valence model, platforms converge to   α∗ which is diﬀerent from the
median voter preferred position (1
2) and this equilibrium corresponds to plat-
forms divergence in the public goods consumption model, since candidates
propose diﬀerent quantities of public goods.
However, when the comparative advantage of a candidate is not high
enough, the other candidate may want to imitate it. As in the case of a
small absolute advantage, one cannot guarantee existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium. This leads to the following result (here, θx,θ y > 1i sa l w a y s
true).






The following graph represents the area where a pure strategy equilibrium
exists:
We now present two comparative statics results on the equilibrium. First
we show, not surprisingly, that a candidate who has a higher comparative
advantage, obtains a higher payoﬀ.
Corollary 1 A candidate payoﬀ increases with his comparative advantage:
∂πA∗
∂θx




However, we also obtain the less obvious result that, when candidate
















Figure 1: Pure Nash Equilibrium and Comparative Advantages
18Corollary 2













Corollary 2 shows that an increase in a candidate’s competence does not
necessarily translate into an increase in the public good provision in the
equilibrium platform. This result stems from two countervailing eﬀects. On
the one hand, when ηA
x increases, candidate A substitutes public good x to
public good y (a substitution eﬀect). But, on the other hand, candidate A
can increase is number of votes by increasing yA∗. And, if the comparative
advantages are strong, he may have an incentive to increase his provision of
public good y (an income eﬀect which may dominate the substitution eﬀect).
4.2 Comparative advantage and platform symmetry
In this section, we provide a suﬃcient condition under which candidate B
chooses a more symmetric platform than candidate A when both candidates









Proposition 8 If A has a comparative advantage in x and B ac o m p a r a t i v e
advantage in y then:






































Proposition 8 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the plat-







y is large enough. The natural question arising at
this point can be, does there exist a link between competencies symmetry
































? The answer is no. Indeed, consider the fol-
lowing numerical example; let ηA
x = 10, ηA
y =5 ,ηB
x =6a n dηB

























.T h e n B has more
balanced competencies but is program is more asymmetric than candidate
A’s one.
4.3 Mixed strategy equilibrium: existence
As in the case of an absolute advantage, when candidates have comparative
advantages, a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists:
Proposition 9 If candidates have comparative advantages, then a mixed
strategy equilibrium always exists.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that when candidates have two-dimensional competences,
two kinds of advantages can be deﬁned. The Absolute advantage is simi-
lar to the Unanimity Valence Advantage, and the disadvantaged candidate
generally adopts a more extremist equilibrium position than the advantaged
candidate. The conclusion is diﬀerent when the candidates have comparative
advantages. Platforms converge in the valence model form, but candidates
provide diﬀerent quantities of public goods and their probability of winning
increases with their competencies. Furthermore, we have given necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a (unique) pure strategy equilib-
rium. We also show existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium when the pure
strategy equilibrium fails to exist. A natural following research would be to
characterize such mixed strategy equilibria and to consider public goods pro-













B)) is an equilibrium:
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B ≥ 1, with at least one inequality being strict and
(x∗
A,y∗
A)  =( x∗
B,y∗
B):A can propose x 
A = x∗































B ≥ 1, with at least one inequality being strict and
(x∗
A,y∗
A)  =( x∗
B,y∗
B). Candidate B’ payoﬀ is nul (π∗
B =0 ), because he pro-
poses smaller quantities of both public goods than his adversary. We distin-
guish the following subcases:
If x∗
A >η B




















y . B can propose
y 
B >y ∗
A, hence πB = F (  α)R>0.
If y∗
A >η B




























y , then B can move to y  
B >y ∗
A with   xB >x ∗
A and he
gets a strictly positive payoﬀ. Finally, it cannot be an equilibrium.








y ≤ 1 : The proof is in two steps. In
the ﬁrst step, we show that the situations described in proposition 3 are
equilibria. In the second step, we show that there is no other equilibrium.










































, with at least one inequality
being strict. Hence, candidate B cannot be strictly better. Furthermore, A
gets the maximum payoﬀ, π∗
A = R.







































,Bcan not receive a strictly positive payoﬀ. Finally, it cannot
be an equilibrium.










































































with at least one strict inequality, so that IA < 1
2 = IB.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :To prove the result, we rely on the main Theorem
of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, p.14):
Theorem 1 (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986) Let [(Si,U i);i =1 ,...,N] be a
game. Let Si ⊆ R1 (i =1 ,...,N) a closed interval and Ui : S → R1 (i =1 ,...,N)









where ∆(i) is a positive integer and for each integer d, with 1 ≤ d ≤ ∆(i),
and fd




is upper semi-continuous and Ui (si,s−i) is bounded and weakly lower semi-
continuous in si. Then, the game [(Si,U i);i =1 ,...,N] possesses a mixed-
strategy equilibrium.
Let reformulate our game to be able to apply the Dasgupta-Maskin Theorem.
Let xP = sPηxP and yC = ηyP (1 − sP), with P = A,B, and p ∈ [0,1]. When
candidate A has an absolute advantage our electoral game is equivalent to
the game deﬁned by [(Si,π i);i = A,B], with Si =[ 0 ,1],i= A,B and the
payoﬀs functions are:
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, and,
if sP / ∈{ 0,1} and s−P ∈{ 0,1},
πP = R and π−P =0 , and,
if sP = s−P ∈{ 0,1},



































Let us verify the conditions of the Dasgupta-Maskin Theorem:







are continuous excepted on a set of mass 0.
We have to choose ∆ (A)=∆( B)=4 . Furthermore, f1
AB (0) = f1
BA(0) = 0,
f2
AB (0) = f2
BA(0) = 1,f 3
AB (1) = f3
BA(1) = 0, and f4
AB (1) = f4
BA(1) = 1.
In our case, S∗ (A)=S∗ (B).π A
 
sA,s B 
is continuous in sA on the rest of
the strategy space, because, if sB / ∈{ 0,1},limsA→0   α = limsA→1   α =1 , if





























4. 0 ≤ πi
 
sA,s B 
≤ 1,(i = A,B)t h e nUi (si,s−i) is bounded.
5. Let us prove that πi
 
sA,s B 
is weakly lower semi-continuous in si. Let
S∗∗
i (i)={si ∈ Si : ∃s−i ∈ S−i such that (si,s−i) ∈ S∗∗ (i)}, the deﬁnition of
weak lower semi-continuity is given by:
Deﬁnition 10 Ui (si,s−i) is weakly lower semi-continuous in si if ∀si ∈
S∗∗
i (i),∃λ ∈ [0,1] such that ∀s−i/(si,s−i) ∈ S∗∗ (i),
λlim inf
si→−si
Ui (si,s−i)+( 1− λ)lim inf
si→+si




and let sB be ﬁxed.
Case 1 sB =0 : here, there are two discontinuities, when sA =0and sA =1 .
If sA is strictly between these two bounds, then πA = R. In the ﬁrst disconti-
nuity, πA (0,0) =
R
2, liminfsi→−0πi (si,0) =
R
2 and , liminfsi→+0πi (si,0) =
R. If we choose λ =1 , it is true that R
2 ≥ R
2. In the second discontinuity, sA =
1. Since πA (1,0) =
R
2, liminfsi→−1 πi (si,0) = R and liminfsi→+1 πi (si,0) =
R
2, if we take λ =0 , it is true that R
2 ≥ R
2.
Case 2 sB =1:here, there are also two discontinuities. The ﬁrst when
sA =0 , and the second when sA =1 . If sA is strictly between these two
bounds, her payoﬀ is constant and equal to R. In the ﬁrst discontinuity,
πA (0,1) = R
2 = liminfsi→−0 πi (si,1). Let us choose λ =1 , we verify R
2 ≥
R
2. In the second discontinuity, πA (1,1) = R










Let us now consider πB
 
sA,s B 
and ﬁx sA. There are two discontinuity values
of sA,0a n d1 . For the two values, there are two discontinuities, when sB =0
24and when sB =1 . Since candidate B sp a y o ﬀi se q u a lt oR when sA ∈]0,1[
and it is equal to R







is weakly lower semi-continuous in sB.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let consider the modiﬁed model where the utility




































Suppose 0 <   α
 
sA,s B 

























































lnθxθy ∈ [0,1], because the deﬁnition of comparative advantages ensures




is not deﬁned or does not belong to ]0,1[ cannot correspond to an
equilibrium.
First remark that all situations where one candidate gets a nul payoﬀ
cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, this candidate can always imitate his op-





lnθxθy and both players payoﬀs become strictly
positive.
25Now suppose that   α
 
sA∗,s B∗ 










A =1 ) ,o rsA∗ or sB∗ is in {0,1}.I fD
 
sA∗,s B∗ 
=0 ,t h e n






= R if s


















such that sA∗ ≤ 1−θy
 
1 − sB∗ 








,w h e r e a sπB  
sA∗,s B 
= R until 0 ≤ sB ≤
θy−1+sA∗
θy ≤
1. Hence B has an incentive to deviate, this is a contradiction. If sA∗ or
sB∗ is in {0,1}, but not both of them. Then one of the candidate gets a nul
payoﬀ and this cannot be an equilibrium. Now, if sA∗ and sB∗ are in {0,1},
then πA  
sA∗,s B∗ 
= πB  
sA∗,s B∗ 
= R
2. If one of the candidate deviates and
locates in ]0,1[, he gets all the votes, then this is not an equilibrium.
Suppose that   α
 
sA,s B 
≤ 0o r  α
 
sA,s B 
≥ 1, then one of the two
players gets a null payoﬀ. We have already proved that this cannot be an
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7: We ﬁrst show the following lemma (remember






P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Let θx = θ and θy = λθ with
1
θ <λ . Then the
inequality can be written as follows:
h(λ)=λθ
2 lnθ − (θ − 1)lnλ − (2θ − 1)lnθ>0,
The diﬀerentiate of h is h  (λ)=θ2 lnθ −
(θ−1)
λ >θ l(θ)=θ2 lnθ − θ(θ − 1).
The function l is increasing (l  (θ)=l n θ)a n dl(1) = 0, then h  (λ) > 0.
Furthermore, h(1) = 0, then the inequality is always true.











. There are many situations where A may
obtain a higher payoﬀ. Straightforwardly, candidate A has no incentive to
play sA ∈{ 0,1},o t h e r w i s e ,πA  
sA,s B∗ 
=0 .












then his payoﬀ πA  
sA,s B∗ 







1−sA ≤ 1 (it means that N
 
sA,s B∗ 
< 0). This is equivalent to
sB∗
sB∗+(1−sB∗)θxθy <s A ≤ 1 − θy(1 − sB∗). Such a value of sA exists if and
only if
θx(θy−1)
θxθy−1 <s B∗ < 1.S i n c e sB∗ =
lnθy
lnθxθy,l e m m a1e n s u r e st h a tt h i s
cannot be true. Then candidate A cannot play this kind of deviation. Now,
suppose 0 <   α
 
sA,s B∗ 
< 1,t h e nπA  
sA,s B∗ 
























































Then sA∗ maximizes the payoﬀ of candidate A in this case.









ByA =1 ). Then
sB∗
sB∗+(1−sB∗)θxθy =






= R if s




















In the previous case, we have seen that 1 − θy
 
1 − sB∗ 
< sB∗
sB∗+(1−sB∗)θxθy,
then this deviation is not proﬁtable (πA  
sA∗,s B∗ 
>π A  
sA,s B∗ 
=0 ).








ByA < 1). Suppose that A can deviate
27by playing sA such that and   α
 
sA,s B∗ 
≥ 1,t h e nh i sp a y o ﬀπA  
sA,s B∗ 
= R.




1−sA < 1 and sB∗







).These two conditions are equivalent to sB∗
θx ≤
sA < sB∗
sB∗+(1−sB∗)θxθy. Such a deviation exists if and only if sB∗ >
θx(θy−1)
θxθy−1 ,a n d
lemma 1 states this cannot be true. Now suppose that A deviates by playing
sA such that and 0 <   α
 
sA,s B∗ 







0). Then sA <
sB∗
θx and sA < 1 − θy
 
1 − sB∗ 
. It is easy to show that
1 − θy
 
1 − sB∗ 
< sB∗
θx with lemma 1, then sA < 1 − θy
 
1 − sB∗ 
.T h eﬁ r s t
























The roots of this equation are given by   α
 
sA,s B∗ 



























1−sA < 1 is the only re-
maining possible deviation. Candidate A has an incentive to deviate if and
only if πA  
sA,s B∗ 
>π A  
sA∗,s B∗ 
, i.e. if and only if sA > 1−sA∗.L e t  sA =
1 − sA∗,t h e nA has an incentive to deviate iﬀ   sAD
 
  sA,s B∗ 
>N
 
  sA,s B∗ 
and   sA < 1 − θy
 
1 − sB∗ 


















































lnθx or θy ≥
lnθy
lnθx), i.e. iﬀ θxθy ≥
lnθy
lnθx. Finally, the equilibrium
exists iﬀ θx lnθx ≥
lnθy
θy and θy lnθy ≥
lnθx
θx .




￿ α∗ − 1
2 ≥ 0i f
and only if X ≥
1−
￿ α∗
￿ α∗ and is a strictly increasing function of X, because






































































































− 1. With simple computations, we ﬁnd that this last expression















Proof of Proposition 9: Candidates have comparative advantages, then
the game is symmetric in A and B . Hence, we will only consider candidate
A. We apply the Dasgupta et Maskin Theorem (1986, p.14), presented in
the Proof of Proposition 5. Let suppose that xP = ηxP ∗ sP and yP =
ηyP ∗ (1 − sP),(sP ∈ [0,1];P = A,B). We deﬁne
 











  x = ηA
x
θy−1
θyθx−1. The game with comparative advantages is equivalent to the
following game: [(Si,π i);i = A,B] the electoral competition game, with Si =
[0,1],i= A,B and:














⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − F (  α))R if sA > max
 
sB
θx ,1 − θy
 
1 − sB  
(1A)



























and sB  = sA (4A)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
,and,
if sP / ∈{ 0,1} and s−P ∈{ 0,1},
πP = R and π−P =0 , and,
if sP = s−P ∈{ 0,1},












































Let us verify the conditions of the Dasgupta-Maskin Theorem:




is continuous excepted on a set of measure 0. We have to
choose ∆ (A)=5 . Furthermore, f1
AB (0) = 0, f2
AB (0) = 1,f 3
AB (1) = 0,
f4
AB (1) = 1, f5
AB
 
  sA 
=   sB. To prove that πA
 
sA,s B 
is continuous on the
rest of the strategy space, we distinguish between two cases:





θxsB > 1 − θy
 








30continuous in sA = 1
θxsB and in sA =1− θy
 
1 − sB 

























































≤ sB < 1,s B  = sA. Here 1
θxsB ≤ 1 − θy
 





is deﬁned by (1A), (2A) and (4A). We have to show that πA
 
sA,s B 
is continuous in sA = 1
θxsB and in sA =1− θy
 
1 − sB 
































































314. 0 ≤ πi
 
sA,s B 
≤ 1,(i = A,B)t h e nUi (si,s−i) is bounded.
5. We have to show that πA
 
sA,s B 
is weakly lower semi-continuous in sA.
We have presented the deﬁnition of the weakly lower semi-continuity in the
Proof of Proposition 5. There are discontinuities only when sB =0o r1o r
  sB. We distinguish these three cases:
Cases 1 and 2: identical to Cases 1 et 2 of the Proof of Proposition 5.
Case 3: sB =   sB. Here, there is a discontinuity in sA =   sA. Since
1
θx  sB =
1 − θy
 
1 −   sB 
=   sA. Candidate A payoﬀ is given by:
πA (sA,s B)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − F (  α))R if sA >   sA
R
2 if sA =   sA
F (  α)R if sA <   sA
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
To prove the lower semi-continuity in this point, we need to compute
limsA→+




￿ sA   α
 
sA,s B 













Furthermore, when sA >   sA, we obtain:
  sA
1 − sA ≤
Ln
 
1 −   sA 
− Ln
 
1 − sA 
Ln(sA) − Ln(  sA)
≤
  sA
















=   s
A,




























  sA,  sB 
= R
2, then if we choose λ = 1
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